Semper Fi!
The transformation model proposed by miltiary historians Allan Millet and Williamson Murray proposes a number of different factors that can influence an organization’s ability to be innovative and transform itself. What factors do you think most influenced the USMC’s adoption of amphibious warfare doctrine in the interwar years? In particular, was the USMC more driven by war plans and the nature of the threat than it was by the very real possibility that budget constraints might eliminate it as an organization? In an era of real budget restrictions that the US military will face in the future, what core capability does the modern USMC bring to the table? Does that capability warrant a USMC that is 25% the size of the army? Will there be a future fight over the USMC and its mission or is the USMC so much of a part of the American military tradition that it doesn’t have to justify its mission?
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The Leavenworth Way of War 
During the interwar period, the USMC was inspired by the foresight of MG Lejeune to create a marine force that could conduct amphibious assaults in support of naval operations. Lejeune believed that the USMC played a vital role in the seizure and control of forward naval bases in order to facilitate future operations. However with the publishing of War Plan Orange, MG Lejeune also realized the potential role the USMC could play in supporting military operations from sea. The first and foremost issues regarding the Marine Corps in the interwar period was the minimal knowledge by the government and public of what the Marine Corps did and who it ultimately reported to. Many people did not, and still do not, realize the Marine Corps falls under the Department of the Navy. While the Joint Army-Navy board considered the US Army for execution of amphibious operations, the Marine Corps ultimately won the role through development and refinement of amphibious warfare doctrine. Ironically, the Marine Corps’ amphibious doctrine that saved them was written at a time during the depression in which the Marine Corp was also struggling to remain relevant. Ultimately, the search for relevance was not what saved the Marine Corp, but the predictive foresight of Marine leaders during the interwar period that laid the constructive foundation for what would morph into the modern day Marine Corps.