The Leavenworth Way of War

History Discussion at CGSC

Welcome to History CGSC Class of 2017



Just a short a note to welcome the new CGSC class 2017, Staff Section 19, to the blog. As I have said in class, the purpose of this blog is to continue the discussion of the class room topics in another venue.

I will be posting a class specific blog entry for each class . Anyone in the class, actually anyone –other CGSC students as well anyone from the public, military or civilian, not affiliated with CGSC –can comment on what I post.

I do not plan to edit in any way the comments on the posts. However, in the extremely rare case where someone might spam or flame the comments sections, or post anything I deem inappropriate, I will edit those out. The blog guidelines posted on this page should be considered before posting.

If you have something to say relevant to the class that you want to express that does not go directly to the lead in blog, feel free to add that in the comments section as well. In other words, the topics are not limited to the subjects I suggest, but are limited only limited by what is relevant to our history class and your CGSC experience.

A recommendation: be aware of your writing style and grammar in your comments. Like any public writing, including email, people will judge you by how you write as well as what you write. I won’t be concerned about your style –but it is just natural that others will. Do what I do –write your blog comments in word –spell check and proof read them –and then post them. Its not a big deal, but it is an opportunity to practice good communications habits.

That said, ignore all of my style and grammar errors and focus on my content 😉

Again, welcome to the blog for AY 15 and have fun!

September 1, 2015 Posted by | Admin | Leave a comment

CAC Blog Rules

Use these rules as a guide when posting.

August 27, 2014 Posted by | Admin | 2 Comments

H306: Doctrine After Vietnam

Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, Combined Arms Center (CAC)Commander 1973-1976, and General William E. DePuy, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commander 1973-1976, had dyametrically opposed views of the purpose and nature of army doctrine. Ultimately, General Depuy’s view won out, resulting in the ineffective 1976 FM 100-5 focused on the concept of the “Active Defense.” General Cushman’s opposing view which included a nuanced view of war-fighting; emphasized education over training; and focused on creative thinking over predictable solutions, was the loser. Depuy’s view is largely credited with setting the conditions for the transformation to the successful “Airland Battle” doctrine of the 1980s. Did the army make an error following Depuy’s doctrinal view, and how does this debate provide insights into the on-going doctrinal transformation of the 21st Century? Was Depuy just “Lucky” that his active defense doctrine was never tested in battle? Should doctrine be focused solely on its warfighting utility or should it be a multi-demensional tool of the institutional army that facilitiates training, force development, procurement, and leader development as well as warfighting?

March 16, 2017 Posted by | Uncategorized | 4 Comments

H303: Duke Nuke’em

21168During the Korean War US forces were caught in a bloody stalemate because the US, as a matter of policy, choose to keep the war limited. Why did the US not escalate the war and unify the Korean peninsula? Were nuclear weapons a viable option for use in the war? What role do nuclear weapons play in the US strategy in Korea today?

March 16, 2017 Posted by | Uncategorized | 4 Comments

H304: The Korean and Vietnam Wars

Arguably, the US was successful in achieving its desired end state in the Korean War: stopping the expansion of communism in Asia and preserving the existence of the Republic of Korea. Given this success, many US analysts in the early years of Vietnam did not see any serious problems with repeating that success in Vietnam. Was that a correct analysis? If so, then why didn’t the US repeat its success? If not, what were the significant differences between the two situations?

March 16, 2017 Posted by | Uncategorized | 3 Comments

H302: Its the Economy Stupid… Comrade!

Maoist revolutionalry war theory puts the priority of effort on the political line of operations. Our experience with our own domestic politics indicates that the key to successful politics is the economy. Therefore… maybe:

COIN = Politics

Politics = Economy

.’. COIN = Economy


Consider this:  Do populations whose economic aspirations are being met ever revolt?

March 16, 2017 Posted by | Uncategorized | 4 Comments

H302: Mao and Current Insurgencies

There are a wide variety of insurgent groups who have operated against U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003. Very few, if any, have followed a Maoist strategy. Some analysists believe that this fact proves that Mao’s Revolutionary War theory is not relevant to the type of adversaries faced by the U.S. in the GWOT. Are these analysists correct?

As the US military moves forward many believe that the age of Revolutionary war is past, and even if its not, it does not represent an strategic threat to US national interests. Therefore, the US military should leave revolutionary war to special operations forces, and the bulk of the US military resources, to include doctrine, training and organization, should be focused on opposing conventional and nuclear threats from China, Russia and North Korea.

How important to future war is revolutionary war, and to what degree should the US military establishment prepare itself to fight revolutionary war?

March 16, 2017 Posted by | Uncategorized | 3 Comments

H301 Nuclear Strategy and Today’s Operating Environment

At one time nuclear strategy was one of the central pillars of U.S. national defense strategy and foreign policy. Its related technologies were probably the most expensive items in the U.S. defense budget. Deterence was the central concept in the U.S. national strategy to meet the threat of nuclear attack. It was most graphically illustrated by the idea of mutually assured destruction (MAD). However, since the end of the Cold War the idea of nuclear war has been pushed to the margins of the national defense strategy debate. Since 9/11, strategy discussions have continued to largely ignore the issue of nuclear weapons.

There are two nuclear scenarios which have received some attention, both related to the issue of proliferation: one is nuclear armed “rogue” states –most specifically a nuclear armed Korea and the potential for a nuclear armed Iran; and the other threat is small scale “suitcase” nuclear terror attack. These threats are catagorized by the national defense strategy (NDS) as “catastrophic challenges.”

The 2005 NMS identifies the threat of WMD but it does not clearly articulate the role of the U.S. nuclear arsenal relative to the WMD and other threats. The 2006 national military strategy to combat WMD says that offensive operations ” Kinetic (both conventional and nuclear) and/or non-kinetic operations [will] defeat, neutralize or deter a WMD threat or subsequent use of WMD.” The NMS for WMD implies that deterence is still a central part of strategy to combat the threat of nuclear attack.

Some questions to consider regarding the role of nuclear weapons in current strategy:

Is deterence a viable strategy agains the nuclear threats in today’s operating environment? Is deterence against WMD integrated suffeciently with the overall national strategy? Is current U.S. strategy asymetric or symetric?

March 16, 2017 Posted by | Uncategorized | 5 Comments

H208: Feel Lucky?

The title of a famous book on the battle of Midway Island is “Miracle at Midway,” indicating the degree to which “luck” played a role in the US victory in the battle. How do you feel about luck in military operations? Clausewitz called it chance –and recognized that it had a role in determining the outcome. Jomini might have said that things like luck and chance play on both sides and cancel each other out and therefore are irrelevant. Where do you stand? Also, how do you think the role of chance or luck should be addressed in PME or should it be addressed at all?

January 30, 2017 Posted by | Uncategorized | 5 Comments

H210: My Doctrine Right or Wrong!

The results of flawed doctrine: Unescorted Daylight Strategic Bombing

The focus of H200 was an analysis of how useful doctrine developed in peace time, based on previous war experience, proved to be in the conduct of operations in World War II.

The history of interwar transformation and doctrine development process provides insights into the relationship of peacetime visions of future wars and the actual conduct of war. In World War II the German army, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the U.S. Army Air Force all attempted to execute doctrine developed in the years after WWI, on the battlefields of WWII.

In some cases, blitzkrieg doctrine for example, the doctrine proved remarkably effective. In other cases, the primacy of the battleship in navy doctrine for example, the doctrine failed to meet the requirements of modern war. Were there organizational characteristics that permitted a particular service (the German army) to have an accurate understanding of tactical ground warfare, and another (the U.S. navy) fail to understand the importance of key technologies?

In the case of airpower doctrine, the US Air Force strategic bombing campaign in Europe achieved great results by forcing the destruction of the Luftwaffe. However, it did not achieve its primary doctrinal objective –force the German government to surrender. On the other hand, strategic airpower, armed with atomic weapons, did cause the Japanese to surrender. Did WWII prove that airpower doctrine, as advocated by Generals Billy Mitchell and Douhet, was effective?

Some observers believe that writing doctrine in peace time is a futile exercise because the lessons of history are such that the conditions of the next war will be completely different from the last war and impossible to predict. Getting doctrine right is more luck than genius. Thus only very multi-functional formations are of any use to the army of the future, and only vague, general and generic doctrine is appropriate for the current and future operating environment. Do you agree or disagree?

Are there doctrinal issues which our current military refuses to recognize because we have invested too much in organization, training, and equipment to change the doctrine at this point? If so what are they and why are they flawed?

January 30, 2017 Posted by | Uncategorized | 4 Comments

H209: Doctrine versus Technology

In the video above, virtually none of the technology, or even the tactics techniques and procedures used to attack Iwo Jima were available seven years earlier when the Marines issued their 1938 manual on landing operations.

In the interwar years the Germans and the U.S. Marine Corps developed concepts for operations (doctrine) before they developed the enabling technology.  Ultimately, the doctrine would not have been successful without the technologies that were added later.  However, without the initial doctrine the technologies may  not have ever been developed, or may have been utilized in a different way.  Is this the right way to transform?  Should doctrine always precede technology?  Are there situations where technology should precede doctrine?   Which comes first in the U.S. military today?

January 30, 2017 Posted by | Uncategorized | 5 Comments

H207: The Failure of Barbarossa

Russland-Süd (Don, Stalingrad), Panzer IIIGerman army doctrine in World War II, famously known as Blitzkrieg, contributed to rapid and decisive victory in Poland and France, 1939-1940.  Encouraged by the validation of their doctrine, German leaders embarked on a campaign to conquer the Soviet Union in 1941:  Operation Barbarossa.  Begun in June 1941, the campaign to defeat the USSR was a failure by December 1941 when the Soviet counterattack drove the Germans back from the approaches to Moscow.  A number of reasons are cited for the failure of the campaign:  lack of a clear strategic end state; lack of a clear military objective; failures of intelligence to understand the size and adaptability of the Soviet Army; the logistics failure to support the troops rapid movement, bridge the geographic distances, and support winter operations; a cultural inability of the German high command to think in global strategic terms; and the ability of the Red Army to trade space for time to replenish losses of the opening months of the war.  Which reason do you think is the single most important to the failure of the German campaign and why?

January 30, 2017 Posted by | Uncategorized | 5 Comments