The transformation model proposed by miltiary historians Allan Millet and Williamson Murray proposes a number of different factors that can influence an organization’s ability to be innovative and transform itself.  What factors do you think most influenced the USMC’s adoption of amphibious warfare doctrine in the interwar years?  In particular, was the USMC more driven by war plans and the nature of the threat than it was by the very real possibility that budget constraints might eliminate it as an organization?  In an era of real budget restrictions that the US military will face in the future, what core capability does the modern USMC bring to the table?  Does that capability warrant a USMC that is 25% the size of the army?  Will there be a future fight over the USMC and its mission or is the USMC so much of a part of the American military tradition that it doesn’t have to justify its mission?

During the years 1919 to 1941 Naval Aviation carved out a place for itself in the Navy by being a member of the battleship team.  Naval aviation supported the battleship-centric fleet by finding the enemy fleet, fixing and harassing the enemy fleet through air attack, and defending the fleet from enemy air.  WWII forced navies around the world to recognize that airpower at sea had become the dominant capability of naval forces.  As a result, the aircraft carrier became the center of naval strategy, operations, tactics and force development.   However, the rise of the aircraft carrier in the US miltiary during WWII occured in an enviroment in which a US Air Force did not exist.  How did the absence of a US Air Force help the development of Naval Aviation in the US in the interwar years?

The first clash between the US Air Force and Naval Aviation over roles, missions, and most importantly, budget, occured after the draw-down of the US miltiary after WWII and was known as the “Revolt of the Admirals.”  Are we destined for another revolt of the Admirals?  What is the core capability of Naval Aviation today and is it worth the cost in the budget of maintaining a fleet built around aircraft carriers?  What does the aircraft carrier provide the US military that is unique and different from what the Air Force is capable of?  Should todays US Navy be built around a unique naval capability such as the submarine, rather than the aircraft carrier which seems to perform a similar role as the US Air Force?

The transformation case study of the US Army Air Corps in the interwar years focused largely on the personality of BG William “Billy” Mitchell.  He has since then been considered one of the “fathers” of the modern US Air Force.  Was he really a positive  force for the transformation of the Air Force?  Could his efforts have been more effective if he had worked inside the structure of the military as did his superior, Major General Mason Patrick, the Chief of the Air Service?

Air power doctrine as advocated by Italian theorist Giulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard, and Billy Mitchell predicted essentially that decisive strategic effects could be achieved from air.  In other words, air power was capable of winning wars without the assistance of the other services.  This theory has been echoed by modern US Air Force leaders such as Air Force Chiefs of Staffs Michael J. Dugan and Merrill A. McPeak.  These ideas have been detailed in such popular discussions of air strategy as The Air Campaign and Shock and Awe.  Can air power win wars decisively and at low cost in some cases?  If it can not, what capability justifies a separate Air Force?  If it can, does that argue against jointness as central component of US military doctrine?

The below article describes how history and critical thinking aids problem solveing in today’s environment.  This goes to heart of why we teach history here at CGSC.

Historical Ignorance and Economy

Kaiser Wilhelm II, German Emperor Helmut Von Molke, Chief of the German General Staff, 1914

General Helmut Von Molke, Chief of the German General Staff, 1914

“I answered His Majesty that this was impossible. The deployment of an army a million strong was not a thing to be improvised, it was the product of a whole year’s hard work and once planned could not be changed. If His Majesty were to insist on directing the whole army to the east, he would not have an army prepared for the attack but a barren heap of armed men disorganized and without supplies.”

The Kaiser: “Your uncle would have given me a different answer.”

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Given the below definitions from our current doctrine, and the conversation described above, what did Von Molke not understand about strategy?  Also, do you think there is a danger of U.S. national and miltiary leadership making a similar mistake?  Why or why not?

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JOINT:

strategy — A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 3-0)

National Security Strategy — A document approved by the President of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also called NSS. See also National Military Strategy; strategy; theater strategy. (JP 3-0)

national defense strategy — A document approved by the Secretary of Defense for applying the Armed Forces of the United States in coordination with Department of Defense agencies and other instruments of national power to achieve national security strategy objectives. Also called NDS. (JP 3-0)

National Military Strategy — A document approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for distributing and applying military power to attain national security strategy and national defense strategy objectives. Also called NMS. See also National Security Strategy; strategy; theater strategy. (JP 3-0)

theater strategy — An overarching construct outlining a combatant commander’s vision for integrating and synchronizing military activities and operations with the other instruments of national power in order to achieve national strategic objectives. See also
National Military Strategy; National Security Strategy; strategy. (JP 3-0)

ARMY / MARINE

strategy – (DOD) The art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national and/or multinational objectives. See FM 3-0. (FM 1-02).

military strategy – (DOD) The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force. See also strategy. See FM 3-0. (FM 1-02).

In 1908 there were two military schools in operation at Fort Leavenworth, both under the general organization called the Army Service Schools. The first school was the School of the Line. It was attended by officers, generally lieutenants and captains with six to ten years service, selected from their regiments. There were approximately fifty officers in the course. The other course was a second year follow-on to the School of the Line. It was called the General Staff School. Attending this course were the top twenty-four graduates of the previous year from the School of the Line.

Below is an excerpt from the 1908 Commandant’s report. It is taken from the report of the General Staff School, Department of Tactics. It describes the history instruction provided to the General Staff School officers. Note that the total hours of history instruction was approximately 156 (in addition to the the school of the Line’s total of 76). Consider that in today’s CGSC course the total hours of history instruction is 60. Also note that Lieutenant George C. Marshall was the honor graduate of this class and then stayed on additional two years as a member of the faculty. The author of this report was Major J.F. Morrison, head of the Tactics Department.

Click here to see the full original report.

THE ARMY STAFF COLLEGE

DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,

The Secretary,

August 31, 1908.

The Army Service Schools.

The course in Military History was another innovation and was a success. One campaign (The Peninsular,

1862) was taken. The course was preceded by ‘two lectures on Historical Research. A large

scale map was prepared for us by the Engineering Department covering the theatre of operations. All

movements of the armies were followed day by day to the conclusion of the campaign. The method of

historical study now adopted in all great universities was adapted to military research. Every move and

the reasons therefore were sought and credibility of testimony weighed. The class did not accept secondhand accounts but sought corroborative testimony or information from original sources. One campaign so studied is more valuable to a military student than ‘many more superficially studied. The College Library is well supplied with necessary books. Captain A. L. Conger, 29th Infantry, was the instructor in charge and developed the course; it was fully planned and carried out by him. The class did splendid work and spent many extra hours in the library looking up information.

So successful do I believe it to have been that in the next year thirty-nine half days will be given to this work and three preliminary lectures instead of two. This can not replace the course in the Line School but naturally follows it. The Line School course is a necessary preparation for it.

Our profession is largely empiric and a careful and correct study of Military History is most important. Not a memory stored with names and dates, but a knowledge of important campaigns.

More History:

The class was taken this year for a Staff or Historical Ride from Manassas to Gettysburg. The ride was announced to the class at the beginning of the school year and each member assigned the part he must discuss and the requirements made that careful study of all the campaigns involved was required of those to go. While five half days were allowed for preparation, it was but a small fraction of the time expended on it by the class. During the spring the Staff Class has, in other departments, much work that does not require preparation to be made at home. These evenings were what was counted on for preparation for this ride, and not amiss. The work of the class on this ride, its extent and thoroughness, the complete grasp they got of this part of our Military History, was one of the most satisfactory things to me in the year’s work. The ride was profitable to all concerned and I earnestly recommend that they be continued as long as such satisfactory results are obtained.

Before leaving Fort Leavenworth, Lieutenant Fitch gave a lecture on the Military Geography of Virginia.

PROGRAM FOR THE STAFF RIDE:

July 3d.

Wagons at train for baggage; horses, with lunch.

Class to Bull Run field at the Henry house.

Papers on:

First Bull Run-Captain Baltzell.

Gainsville-Lieutenant Cox.

Groveton-Lieutenan t Fisher.

Second Bull Rur-Captain Raymond.

Camp at Gainsville, ten miles.

July 4th.

Move to Delaplane, twenty-one miles.

July 5th.

Move from Delaplane to Front Royal. eighteen

miles.

Papers on :

Front Royal and retreat to Winchester-Lieutenant Morey.

July 6th.

Wagons to Middletown, nine miles. Cla’ss to Tom’s

Brook via Strasburg, and return via Strasburg to Middletown:

twenty-seven miles.

Papers on :

Tom’s Brook-Captain Herron.

Fisher’s Hill–Lieutenant Collins.

July 7th.

Move from Middletown to Winchester, thirteen

miles.

Papers on :

Cedar Creek, before leaving for Winchester- Lieutenant Beebe.

Kernstown, en route-Captain Kerth and Lieutenant Currie.

July 8th.

Remain all day at Winchester.

Papers on :

Winchester-Captain Hickok.

Opequon-Captain Stodter.

Sketch of Jackson’s campaign in the valley-Captain Major.

Sketch of Early’s campaign in the valley—Captain Conger.

July 9th.

Move to Harper’s Ferry, via Charleston, twenty-eight miles.

Papers on :

The Capture of Harper’s Ferry-Lieutenant Landa.

Events Leading to Antietam-Captain King.

July 10th.

Wagons to Sharpsburg, twelve miles. Class to Crampton’s Gap, via, Pleasant Valley, nine miles; then

to Turner’s Gap, seven miles; then to Sharpsburg for camp. Total for class, twenty-four miles.

Papers on:

Crarnptolz’s Gap-Lieutenant Locke.

Turner’s Gap-Captain Rhodes.

July 11th.

Remain at Sharpsburg.

P a p e r s o n :

Federal Right-Lieutenant Fuqua.

Federal Left-Lieutenant Monter.

July 12th. Wagons direct to Hagerstown. Class via Williamsport.

July 13th.

Move to Fairfield, twenty miles.

Papers on :

The Retreat from Gettysburg-Captain Sharp.

Event8 Leading to Gettysburg-Captain Sayre.

July 14th.

Move to Gettysburg, seven and a half miles.

Papers on :

The First Day’s Fight-Lieutenant Jackson.

July 2d-Culp’s Hill-Captain Birnie.

July 15th.

At Gettysburg.

Papers on :

The Battle of July 2d-The Federal Left-Lieutenant Palmer.

The Battle of July 3d-Left and Center-Lieutenant Hodges.

July 3d-Culp’s Hill-Captain Chiles.

Review of the Battle of Gettysburg-Lieutenant Marshall.

July 16th.

Allowance of a day for delays en route, or for seeing Gettysburg more thoroughly. In the latter case,

the two last named papers to be read on this date.

The above program was carried out. The following problems were given out and the solutions submitted were discussed by instructors and class.

In most cases the discussions were very complete:

I. As Chief of Staff for General McClellan, draw up the order that should have been issued after obtaining the “lost order” September 13th.

2. ‘As Chief of Staff for General Lee, issue the order that should have been issued the night of September 14th, at termination of Battle of South Mountain.

3. As Chief of Staff for General McClellan., write the order that should have been issued the evening of September 16th.

4, Write the order for General Lee% withdrawal after the Battle of Antietam.

5. Take the situation of the troops as it existed the evening of June 30, 1863-As Chief of Staff for General Lee, submit a plan of action.

6. Same as above except as Chief of Staff for General Meade. Submit a plan of action for him.

7a.. Was the position taken by General Sickles with his Corps July 2d, faulty? In other words, is his claim as to the position correct?

7b. With modern arms would the advanced position be better than the one ordered by General Meade?

The above problems were solved by class on the ground after a study of the same and hearing the

papers and discussions relating to the battles in question, but without other preparation or warning.

An interesting article on a relatively new army simulation at this link.

Has anyone worked with this sim and if so, what were your experiences? Positive, negative, in between? Does it benefit units and leaders preparing to go downrange?