Doctrine after Vietnam

Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, Combined Arms Center (CAC)Commander 1973-1976, and General William E. DePuy, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commander 1973-1976, had dyametrically opposed views of the purpose and nature of army doctrine. Ultimately, General Depuy’s view won out, resulting in the ineffective 1976 FM 100-5 focused on the concept of the “Active Defense.” General Cushman’s opposing view which included a nuanced view of war-fighting; emphasized education over training; and focused on creative thinking over predictable solutions, was the loser. Depuy’s view is largely credited with setting the conditions for the transformation to the successful “Airland Battle” doctrine of the 1980s. Did the army make an error following Depuy’s doctrinal view, and how does this debate provide insights into the on-going doctrinal transformation of the 21st Century? Was Depuy just “Lucky?”

Moderate Islam and Terrorism

Great article from the BBC on a moderate Islamic view of terrorism:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8544531.stm

Doctrine after Vietnam

Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, Combined Arms Center (CAC)Commander 1973-1976, and General William E. DePuy, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commander 1973-1976, had dyametrically opposed views of the purpose and nature of army doctrine. Ultimately, General Depuy’s view won out, resulting in the ineffective 1976 FM 100-5 focused on the concept of the “Active Defense.” General Cushman’s opposing view which included a nuanced view of war-fighting; emphasized education over training; and focused on creative thinking over predictable solutions, was the loser. Depuy’s view is largely credited with setting the conditions for the transformation to the successful “Airland Battle” doctrine of the 1980s. Did the army make an error following Depuy’s doctrinal view, and how does this debate provide insights into the on-going doctrinal transformation of the 21st Century? Was Depuy just “Lucky?”

Who Does the American Military See in the Mirror

Jomini and Clausewitz coexist in many modern militaries. Jomini, with his emphasis on principals and application may dominate at the tactical level of war. Clausewitz, with the emphasis on ambiguity, complexity and politics tends to become more important at the more senior leadership levels. The break point logically seems to be at the level of brigade command. Brigade commanders are the military’s senior tacticians. They are involved in the day to day operations and maintenance of the force and have the responsibility to planning, leading, and executing operations. Brigade commanders live in the tactical environment. Cause and effect relationships at the brigade level are more direct and the certainty of factors influencing decisions is higher. Some general officers operate in the tactical environment as well –depending on the operational situation. However, at the general officer level the tendency is for issues to become more complex and for effects to become more separated from causes. Politics, media, and other factors beyond the military’s control begins to intrude on decision making at the general officer level.

Do you agree or disagree with the above analysis?

A challenge facing the effectiveness of general officers is two-fold. First, how does one select the best officer to operate in the Clausewitz world (senior leader) based on the performance of officers who are typically operating in the Jominian world (tactical)? In addition, how does the army train senior leadership (Clausewitzian) thinking before the leader makes the general officer ranks, if there is little or no opportunity to practice it for most of an officer’s career at the tactical level?

Some analysts believe, whether the above described relationship exists or not between Jomini and Clausewitz’s ideas, its irrelevant because American culture demands a demonstrated, positive, scientific approach to all activity and thus the Jominian approach to war dominates the American way of war at all levels. Do you agree?

Clausewitz and the American Military Profession

Clausewitz is famous for his comment that war is an extension of politics by other means. This is not the definition of war, but rather the context within which war takes place. That is, war takes place and is only understandable within the context of politics. By extension then, to be able to effectively plan, supervise, and conduct war a senior military leader must, in addition to his expertise regarding military matters, also be expert at understanding politics.

The sticking point here, is that the professional American military officer is taught to avoid politics. Expert on American military professionalism, Morris Janowitz, stated:

Under democratic theory, the “above politics” formula requires that, in domestic politics, generals and admirals do not attach themselves to political parties or overtly display partisanship. Furthermore, military men are civil servants, so that elected leaders are assured of the military’s partisan neutrality.

In practice, with only isolated exceptions, regulations and traditions have worked to enforce an essential absence of political partisanship.

Has this tradition of non-partisanship caused American military leadership to focus too much on the mechanics of making war at the operational and tactical level? What is the role of the senior military leader in formulating national strategy and can that leader avoid being politically partisan if the different political parties disagree on strategy?

How has the war in Iraq illustrated Clausewitz’s concept of the relationship between war and politics?

How do Clausewitz’s ideas, including the important idea of the trinity, influence our understanding of the current situation in Afghanistan?

Grooming and Picking Generals

In his article, A Failure in Generalship, Paul Yingling argues that the American army’s process for selecting generals is flawed.  He advocates taking the general officer promotion system away from the military and making  it a task for Congress.  Recently, retired MG Scales wrote an article which seemed to back up Yingling’s view (see previous blog).  Numerous other analysts believe that Yingling’s general point is accurate. 

 There are essentially two different military philosophies regarding the system used to pick general officers.  One view is a view that comes from the French revolutionary armies of the 18^th and early 19^th century.  That view is promotion should be based strictly on merit.  In this system officers are selected from among their peers for promotion based on their demonstrated performance  of duty.  Ultimately, this promotion by merit system results in the most competent officers achieving the highest rank.    

A second system comes from the Prussian army of the 19^th Century.  That view is to identify through rigorous testing a small elite cadre of the most intelligent officers in the army.  These officers then are specially educated and assigned for the rest of their careers.  They are specifically groomed to lead the army at the  highest levels.  Promotion in this system is based on intellectual ability, special education, and talent.

The promotion by merit system assumes that the best qualifications for command are demonstrated by success in command.  This philosophy is traditionally the bedrock of promotion in the naval service (both in the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy) where time in command of ships and at sea are the ultimate test of fitness for command.

Which system does the U.S. army promotion system seem to follow?  Is Yingling right?  Is there a failure of generalship in the U.S. Army?  If so, is it because of  the selection philosophy the army uses, or, is it just that the execution of the process is flawed?  If the selection process is flawed, how does that explain Generals like Patraeus and McCrystal?  What process or philosophy do you believe produces the best senior leaders? Does the senior officer promotion system need to change?    

Who Noticed General Scales in our Classroom?

This month in Armed Forces Journal Major General Robert H. Scales wrtoe:

We have too few of these officers because the services tend to accelerate the careers of officers who, early in their careers, show talent at the tactical level of war. Battalion, squadron and ship commanders habitually reward subordinates who mirror themselves. These subordinates tend to be officers who get things done, the go-to, can-do types who make their mark with managerial brilliance. The irony of the system is that the requirement for competence shifts from the tactical to the strategic at just the time in their careers when tactical officers leave command to move on to higher levels of responsibility at the colonel and flag level. As a result, too often we see skillful tacticians thrust into strategic staff jobs they are ill-prepared to perform.

I’d like to know how come I didn’t notice him in the classroom during our discussion of Jomini?  Did someone tape the class and send it to him?  Maybe it was someone from last year’s class because he also hits on subjects from the article in Small Wars Journal and from my notes for next week’s class.  Regardless, it is also very interesting.

If you are interested in the complete article click here.

Comment below on any aspect of the article.

Building Stablity

King Abdul Aziz Al Saud was recognized as a great natural leader, embodying the physical courage and leadership of a great warrior, the sensitivity and instincts of a diplomat, and the devotion and humility of a religous man.  Much of the credit for the success of Saudi Arabia can be attributed to his leadership abilities.  Another reaon for King Abdul Aziz’s success uniting the Arab tribes was the relative geographic isolation of the Saudi center of power, Riyadh, from the area of interest to the Europeans –especially the British (before oil was discovered).  Thus, King Abdul Aziz was able to build up his military and political capacity without the interference of an outside, non-Muslim, power.  His power base was truly indigenous.  Which of these reasons was most important?  What other factors allowed King Abdul Aziz Al Saud to build the Saud Dynasty into the most powerful, and most politically stable in the Middle East?

Valkyrie Review

Saw the movie today and I’ll start by saying I am NOT a Tom Cruise fan. But….It was well made, authentic, and enjoyable. Well worth your movie $. A word of caution however, this movie is history, so I was inclined to love it.

Having said that, I also brought along  my teenage daughter.  She agreed its a quality production, well acted, and good story well told. Also had a German officer student with me. He found the movie very true to the history as taught in Germany and as honored in the German army. He enjoyed the movie immensley.

Four personal observations from me:

1. Overall very little action of the Saving Private Ryan variety. Not really expected so not a big deal.

2. Given that we all know how it ends, the director, acting, and screenplay manage to keep the tension high, the suspense active, and movie moving at a crisp pace.

3. No major short-coming in terms of accuracy of the story or the on-screen details. Uniforms, equipment, and locations are particularly well done. The opening scene in N. Africa was the only “battle” scene and was well done. The uniform details  were particularly impressive.

4. Alot of information is crammed into a short movie with no loss of the essentials. However, it would have been nice if they could have developed the Stauffenberg character more thoroughly. They made the attempt by introducing his family and the potential effects of his actions on them. However, they didn’t develop fully the moral dilemma of German officers choosing between loyalty to country, conscience, and the oath they took to Hitler.  They also underplayed (ignored?) the religious/moral aspect of Stauffenberg’s motiviation.

I would give it 4 stars out of 5.

Strategic Communications

Some interesting insights on the subject from the Army War College:

http://warhistorian.org/wordpress/?p=889