The Naval Air Force?
During the years 1919 to 1941 Naval Aviation carved out a place for itself in the Navy by being a member of the battleship team. Naval aviation supported the battleship-centric fleet by finding the enemy fleet, fixing and harassing the enemy fleet through air attack, and defending the fleet from enemy air. WWII forced navies around the world to recognize that airpower at sea had become the dominant capability of naval forces. As a result, the aircraft carrier became the center of naval strategy, operations, tactics and force development. However, the rise of the aircraft carrier in the US miltiary during WWII occured in an enviroment in which a US Air Force did not exist. How did the absence of a US Air Force help the development of Naval Aviation in the US in the interwar years?
The first clash between the US Air Force and Naval Aviation over roles, missions, and most importantly, budget, occured after the draw-down of the US miltiary after WWII and was known as the “Revolt of the Admirals.” Are we destined for another revolt of the Admirals? What is the core capability of Naval Aviation today and is it worth the cost in the budget of maintaining a fleet built around aircraft carriers? What does the aircraft carrier provide the US military that is unique and different from what the Air Force is capable of? Should todays US Navy be built around a unique naval capability such as the submarine, rather than the aircraft carrier which seems to perform a similar role as the US Air Force?
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The absence of a separate U.S. Air Force in the Interwar years helped development of Naval Aviation because it allowed the Navy and its Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer) to effectively lobby for resources and missions without effective competition. The Army was not interested in competing with the Navy for more aviation responsibilities since they had their own interwar struggles to deal with. Just as important as the first point however is the fact that the United States correctly identified the Pacific area as a likely threat which required a mobile aviation capability. This greatly assisted the BuAer and the Navy in securing those necessary resources. Ultimately a separate Air Force would have created a much more complicated environment for the Navy as they competed for relevancy and resources that included funding, equipment and manpower.
Some of these conditions were exactly the opposite when compared to the British who did not develop a robust carrier capability in the interwar period even though they were they original innovators of the concept from World War One. They did have a separate Royal Air Force that controlled all aviation resources and decisions. They also identified Germany and a mainland Europe conflict as the most likely threat and therefore focused on long range, land based bombers as a primary capability versus carrier. It is possible the Royal Navy could have argued for a more prominent role for Naval aviation, but unfortunately they had limited leadership to do so since most of the RAF leaders backgrounds were in land based capabilities.
Although not having true competition for resources greatly facilitated the U.S. Navy in developing a carrier fleet, the projected threat and subsequent capabilities requirements to defeat that threat likely drove development and priorities equally if not more than effective Navy lobbying.
The additional challenge for the Royal Navy was that the majority of their experienced aviators transfered over to the Royal Air Force following its establishment in 1918. Approximately 60 thousand aviators moved from the Royal Navy (later the Fleet Air Arm) to the Royal Air Force, effectively reducing the overall experience level of the Fleet Air Arm and greatly degrading the senior leadership essential to driving innovation in any military organization. By not having a separate Air Force, the U.S. avoided degrading its experience base and institutional knowledge resident within its Naval aviation. Not only did they have control over recommending budget priorities and strategy to Congress, but the Navy did not have to relinquish its skilled aviators to another organization.
The U.S. Navy Carrier Strike Group of today enables Geographic Combatant Commanders the ability to have effects within four separate warfare domains (air, land, sea, and undersea). In a global threat environment where sea lines of communication, airspace exclusion, and access denial are major focus areas, the Carrier Strike Group provides a unique capability to quickly project military power in support of U.S. national interests. In contrast the Air Force provides the ability to affect targets (strategic and operational), conduct reconnaissance, and rapidly move supplies and equipment. Their operations are limited to primarily two warfare domains, air and land. As U.S. national security policy orients towards the Asia-Pacific theater, the Carrier Strike Groups provide the NCA a unique military capability among the services to act as a deterrent by nature of its location and the mere threat of its capability, while also providing the capability to engage with partner nations who share similar interests regarding maritime security and dominance. Given the change in National Security strategy, the Carrier Strike Group should be a focus for future development and procurement to ensure the U.S. maintains the capability to guard interests within the global environment.