Ends, Ways, and Means in Vietnam
Through the Tet offensive in 1968, some have argued that the United States did not have a firm strategy in Vietnam. For a strategy to be coherent it must logically connect ends, ways, and means. If you assume that the U.S. end was a stable South Vietnamese government, and that the U.S. had the means to achieve that end, how do you evaluate the ways the U.S. pursued the strategy? Some things to think about: What were the U.S. ways? Were they logically connected to the end? What was missing from the U.S. strategy?
3 Comments »
Leave a Reply
-
Archives
- February 2012 (8)
- December 2011 (4)
- November 2011 (2)
- October 2011 (3)
- September 2011 (6)
- August 2011 (1)
- April 2011 (1)
- March 2011 (11)
- January 2011 (1)
- December 2010 (2)
- October 2010 (2)
- September 2010 (5)
-
Categories
-
RSS
Entries RSS
Comments RSS
The ways that America chose to achieve the endstate center around the military and political actions at the operational level that were largely ineffective. While at the outset these were logically tied to the endstate, they became unfocused by changing political tides in America as well as military leaders that were at once aloof and micromanaging. The US strategy lacked clear benchmarks of success as well as a distinct absence of exit strategy or allies that were willing to assist the South in their struggle to the same extent as America. All of these conditions are disturbingly similar to our current approach in the war on terror.
I agree that in previous ears the way American decided to achieve its endstate was largely ineffective. Reasoning being included the growing reliance on military and political decisions at the operational level. The focus solely on military instead of both military and political hinders decisions towards having a viable strategy with clearly defined objectives.
“Vietnam, oh Vietnam… We want a stable pro-Western government that will assist the U.S. in containing Communism… How will we do that without escalating to a mutually assured destruction (MAD) conflict with the Soviet Union??? Let’s keep sending more troops and equipment until we bleed the Communists white, but do not cross any international borders…”
While I, like many Americans, was not present during our our National Leaders’ meetings as they discussed their strategy for Vietnam, I do speculate that it was something like the above. I believe that our leaders knew that they wanted South Vietnam to be governed by a anti-Communist government with favorable ties to the West. What ways and means to use baffled them.
I believe that our national leaders believed that they could prop up the South Vietnamese government primarily with military ways. Heck, who could blame them? We had air, naval, and ground superiority across the globe, with only the Soviet Union’s military as a comparable adversary. So, why couldn’t our military achieve the U.S.’s desired endstate?
As we have seen throughout history, COIN type operations require much more than just military ways to successfully end an insurgency and reconcile the disenfranchised parties. Unfortunately for the U.S., our leaders focused much of their planning to achieve the desired endstate centered on military ways. I believe, as a hind sight jockey, that a more balanced approach with diplomatic, infrastructure, and economic ways would have been more successful than the limited war the U.S. tried to fight.
I state this since it is easier to attrite a population’s people than its ideas. The VCI’s ideology in South Vietnam actually gained support as the ravages of the war waged across its land, creating more insurgents. IF, I capitalize it for emphasis, the U.S. had invested more in all for DIME aspects it may had stemmed the flow of support for the VCI. Without the population’s support the VCI would have floundered and that would have denied the NVA the support of the VC. Able to concentrate on the NVA that PAVN and U.S. forces may have been able to secure the international borders and gained more international support to protect the sovereignty of South Vietnam.
Unfortunately, the above is a lot of hindsight if’s, and’s, and what if’s… As I stated, it is easy for me, and anyone else, to use hindsight to state that the U.S. should have used more of the entire DIME spectrum to quell the VCI insurgency instead of focusing the majority of its efforts on the military to reach its endstate of a pro-Western South Vietnam government.